Nowadays, auto insurance companies set personalized insurance rate based on data gathered directly from their customers' cars. In this paper, we show such a personalized insurance mechanism -wildly adopted by many auto insurance companies -is vulnerable to exploit. In particular, we demonstrate that an adversary can leverage off-the-shelf hardware to manipulate the data to the device that collects drivers' habits for insurance rate customization and obtain a fraudulent insurance discount. In response to this type of attack, we also propose a defense mechanism that escalates the protection for insurers' data collection. The main idea of this mechanism is to augment the insurer's data collection device with the ability to gather unforgeable data acquired from the physical world, and then leverage these data to identify manipulated data points. Our defense mechanism leveraged a statistical model built on unmanipulated data and is robust to manipulation methods that are not foreseen previously. We have implemented this defense mechanism as a proof-of-concept prototype and tested its effectiveness in the real world. Our evaluation shows that our defense mechanism exhibits a false positive rate of 0.032 and a false negative rate of 0.013.
INTRODUCTION
Auto Insurers have long been known for pricing based on customers' evaluated driving risks. Historically, drivers' risks were oftentimes determined simply based on age, gender, model of the car and DMV records. With the recent development in personalization algorithms and auto telematics, personalized pricing strategy in auto insurance industry has evolved into a new era. Consumers' insurance rate now could be based on the actual driving data collected from their vehicles.
Led by Progressive Corporation, many auto insurance companies offer their customers a voluntary discount program, in which a customer needs to connect a telematics device to his car through an On-Board Diagnostic-2 (OBD-2) port. This device records and sends driving data such as vehicle speed and Revolutions Per Minute (RPM) to the insurers. Using these data, insurers then calculate the dangerous driving behaviors of the vehicle operator (e.g., the frequency of the hard brakes [8] ), and analyze its measure to determine if the operator is eligible for an insurance discount and the depth of the discount. According to a new market research report [12] , the insurance telematics market size is expected to grow from USD 857.2 Million in 2015 to USD 2.21 Billion in 2020, at a compound annual growth rate of 20.9%. While there are obvious advantages in embracing personalized auto insurance for both businesses and end customers, there also comes a new form of attack, in which adversaries can exploit the algorithms underlying insurance personalization with the goal of obtaining a fraudulent outcome.
In this paper, we show that miscreants can use off-theshelf hardware to falsify the data to insurance telematics devices, mislead insurance rate adjustment algorithms and ultimately obtain financial profits to which they are not otherwise entitled. Different from existing attacks against insurance telematics devices [10, 11, 27] , one distinguishing feature of our new attack is that it does not exploit any vulnerability resided in the devices. Rather, it leverages services' own personalization mechanisms to alter insurers' thought and decisions. As such, it indicates the current approaches to cyber security are ill-equipped to address the vulnerabilities likely to exist in all personalized auto insurance services.
Since people can engage with technology in non-deterministic fashions, and there is no standard reference to authentic user actions, the key challenge in counteracting the aforementioned attack is to distinguish if the data acquired from a user represent his authentic actions or malicious manipulation. To tackle the challenge, the paper further presents an effective anomaly detection mechanism. The basic idea is to verify the legitimacy of the input data to underlying personalization algorithms by using non-tamperable data acquired from the physical world. More specifically, our detection mechanism uses unforgeable acceleration measures to identify the vehicle speed manipulated by miscreants.
We develop the aforementioned idea by first building a proof-of-concept system prototype which emulates an insurance telematics device with a newly added embedded accelerometer. The system prototype contains two components -an OBD-2 reader and a three-dimensional accelerometer. The OBD-2 reader is used for gathering vehicle speed from a cyber space -a car's OBD computer -while the accelerometer is for sensing vehicle acceleration from the physical world. Although our system prototype does not prevent the physical access to the accelerometer and OBD-2 reader, our work assumes the data acquired through accelerometer are unforgeable for the simple reasons that auto insurers can easily manufacture their insurance telematics devices with an embedded accelerometer and protect it against the physical access by armoring it in a self-destruct box [35] .
Intuition might suggest our physical-space acceleration measures should correlate with the variation in speed acquired from the aforementioned cyber space. As a result, an instinctive reaction would be to compute vehicle velocity from acceleration measures, and then use it for insurance rate customization. However, this is infeasible. First, insurance rate customization needs accurate velocity measure and, in practice, existing techniques [52, 60, 45] do not provide adequate accuracy in velocity measurement. For example, prior studies [49, 59] have indicated that the accelerometerbased velocity estimation adopted in Inertial Navigation System (INS) suffers from integration drift -small errors in the measurement of acceleration and angular velocity are integrated into progressively larger errors in velocity 1 . Second, a car's onboard diagnostic computer can accurately measure the rate of vehicle speed using the rate of rotation of a drive shaft, whereas an accelerometer is susceptible to noise caused by poor road condition and engine vibrations etc. As a result, the measures of speed variation -from cyber and physical spaces -typically exhibit unobserved heterogeneity.
As part of our detection mechanism, we address the challenge of unobserved heterogeneity using a statistical model. In particular, the statistical model follows the framework of mixture regression models, which captures unmeasurable noise in the physical world, and reflects the relationship between physical-space acceleration and the variation in speed acquired from the cyber space. For each physical-space measure, our statistical model outputs a predicted velocity range. In detecting speed manipulation, we examine if the speed variation measure from cyber space extends outside our predicted velocity range. Once discovering the cyberspace measure falls outside the predicted velocity range, our detection mechanism flags the measure as an anomaly.
Our detection mechanism provides several advantages. Most notably, it escalates protection for personalized insurance program. With our detection mechanism, auto insurers can identify the unlawful activities of their policyholders, and prevent losses from fraud. In addition, our mechanism is robust to previously unseen manipulation strategies. We do not construct the underlying statistical model specific for certain manipulation strategies. Rather, we use unmanipulated data to model relationship between cyber-space speed variations and physical-space acceleration, and then utilize the model to evaluate the speed measures acquired from untrustworthy cyber space.
In summary, the paper makes the following contributions.
• We describe a generic attack against personalized car insurance program that allows miscreants to alter their unwanted driving behaviors and potentially obtain unlawful financial profits.
• We demonstrate the new attack against 7 different insurance telematics devices, disclose our findings to corresponding auto insurance providers and raise their attention to the new security problem.
• We present a noise-resilient detection algorithm and 1 In [59] , a quantitative study indicates that the average error in position grows to over 150 meters after 60 seconds of operations.
demonstrate how to use it to counteract the manipulation of driving behaviors.
• We study the effectiveness of our detection algorithm using a 1034-mile driving trace, and show our algorithm achieves a false negative rate of 0.013 and a false positive rate of 0.032.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 surveys related work. Section 3 describes and demonstrates an attack against insurance telematics device. Section 4 presents the overview of our defense system. Section 5 shows a proof-of-concept defense prototype that emulates an insurance telematics device with an accelerometer embedded. Section 6 elaborates a statistical model that identifies the manipulation of vehicle speed using the data gathered from the defense prototype. In Section 7, we evaluate our detection mechanism, followed by technical discussion in Section 8. Finally, we conclude the work in Section 9.
RELATED WORK
There are three lines of work most closely related to ours -cyber attacks in automotive contexts, intelligent transportation system, and anomaly detection. In this section, we discuss these work in turn. Attacks in Automotive Contexts. In recent years, a significant amount of research has been performed in the context of automotive systems. Research in this domain mainly focuses on two aspects -attacks against vehicle antitheft systems [29, 57] and attacks against auto OBD computer [27, 36, 56, 44] .
Attacks against vehicle anti-theft systems exploit the software and hardware weakness of smart car keys. For example, Verdult et al. reverse-engineered a passive RFID tag embedded in electronic vehicle immobilizers and disclosed the weakness in its design and implementation [57] . In another research work, Francillon et al. analyzed the protocol of immobilizers used in modern cars, and demonstrated an adversary can enter and start a car by relaying messages between the car and smart key [29] .
Attacks against auto OBD computer target the internal network of automotive systems. As all modern automobiles rely on a broadcast network to connect the various components of a car -including the engine, transmission, brakes, airbags, lights, and locks -quite a bit of previous research emphasizes on discovering and analyzing the security flaws of the broadcast network. In [36, 18] , Koscher et al. systematically analyzed the fragility of auto broadcast network. In follow-on work [27, 26] , Foster et al. demonstrated that an attacker can compromise a telematics control unit, connect to a vehicle and take the control of the vehicle remotely.
While our attack is performed in the same context, it is significantly distinct. In terms of the goal of our attack, an adversary aims to obtain a fraudulent insurance discount rather than taking the control or gaining access to a vehicle. From the technical perspective, the success of our attack does not rely upon any vulnerabilities or flaws resided in the software or hardware of an automotive system. In fact, our attack only distorts or counterfeits the data gathered from automotive systems. Intelligent Transportation System. Intelligent transportation system [5] aggregates sensory data from multiple sources for different purposes, such as realtime traffic delay prediction [55, 20] , road and traffic condition monitoring [45, 25] , and driving behavior estimation [24, 19, 46] , etc. Among these applications, many use physical-world data to predict specific events. To name a few, NeriCell [45] uses sensing components on smartphones to detect potholes, bumps, braking, and honking, and thus obtain a picture of road surface quality as well as traffic conditions. Nericell addresses the problem of accelerometer re-orientation when the phone's orientation changes over time. Similarly, Pothole Patrol [25] is designed to identify potholes using accelerometer data. It avoids the re-orientation problem by mounting the accelerometer at a known orientation. In our work, our detection model does not rely on orientation. Specifically, our model takes input from a 3-axis accelerometer, and predicts a velocity variation range in a direct manner. Anomaly Detection. In terms of defense, our work resembles anomaly detection which identifies patterns in data that do not conform to an expected behavior. In the past decades, anomaly detection has been studied in several research communities across a large number of data domains, including high-dimensional data [15] , uncertain data [16] , streaming data [14, 13] , network data [30, 33] and time series data [41] . Though the nature of the data in our application fits the data type in time series, applying the techniques developed for that data domain is not straightforward, for the reason that the exact notion of an anomaly is different for different application domains. For example, in the stock market domain fluctuations in the stock value might be normal while similar deviation in our application domain is considered as an anomaly. In addition, the data in our application contains a lot of noise that tends to be similar to the actual anomalies. Consequently, anomaly detection techniques that design specifically for other applications are unlikely to be effective against our attack.
ATTACK AGAINST PERSONALIZED IN-SURANCE
In this section, we show that insurance telematics devices are vulnerable to a new class of attack in which an adversary can manipulate the data sent to the devices with the goal of obtaining a fraudulent discount from insurers' personalized insurance program. In particular, we first describe the overview of insurance telematics devices followed by technical background relevant to the devices. Then, we reverse engineer the devices and explore how they operate. Based on the knowledge acquired through our reverse engineering, we demonstrate potential attacks against insurers' personalized insurance program. Last but not least, we discuss the cost of our attack and some ethical concerns.
Overview of Telematics Device
An insurance telematics device is typically used for monitoring the driving habits of auto insurance policyholders. It collects information about when a policyholder uses his vehicle, how far he drives and whether he drives with sharp braking. In addition, it collects the Vehicle Identification Number (VIN). Using these information together, an insurer calculates personalized insurance rates for its customers. In general, policyholders who volunteer to install a telematics device can get a markdown on their auto insurance of up to 50% if they minimize hard braking, the time behind the wheel and the number of minutes they spend driving during higher risk hours [8, 6, 1, 9] .
Typically, a telematics device runs a micro-kernel on an embedded processor. Using a cellular modem embedded, it communicates with an insurer's data center and sends back to the insurer the aforementioned information [17, 56] . The telematics device physically connects to a car's OBD-2 port -SAE J1962 connector located under the driver's side dashboard -so that it can send specially formatted diagnostic command messages over CAN bus, communicate with many Electronic Control Unit (ECU) modules and monitor the vehicle operation. To be eligible to an insurance discount, a policyholder must plug in the device and drive with it. The telematics device periodically pings an insurer's data center and ensures it is not physically disconnected. Figure 1 illustrates how a telematics device communicates with an insurer's data center and interacts with ECU modules built into the car.
Technical Background
In this section, we describe the technical background of ECU modules, CAN bus, and OBD-2.
ECU Modules
Electronic Control Unit (ECU) is a generic term for a device that controls one or more electrical systems in a vehicle. It is the "brain" of a motor vehicle that monitors and controls vehicle operation such as brake, electronic fuel injection and ignition timing etc. Some typical ECU modules include Brake Control Module (BCM), Transmission Control Module (TCM) and Engine Control Module (ECM) etc. As is shown in Figure 1 , ECU modules can communicate with each other through Controller Area Network (CAN bus) without a central computer.
CAN Bus
CAN bus is a multi-master broadcast serial bus standard designed to allow many ECU modules to communicate with each other within a vehicle. When an ECU module sends a message, every other ECU module on the bus receives it and can choose to respond to it or ignore it. CAN defines the structure and the way data are transferred between ECU modules.
OBD-2
OBD-2 is a standard that specifies the type of diagnostic connector and its pinout, the electrical signaling protocols available, and the messaging format. An OBD-2 port is an physical interface, through which an OBD-2 device (e.g., an insurance telematics device) can access to various ECU modules and retrieve their statuses such as engine temperature and engine speed etc. As is illustrated in Figure 1 , an OBD-2 device sends specially formatted diagnostic command messages over the CAN bus. ECU modules on the network send out the requested status information over CAN when asked. To query vehicle speed, for example, a technician can enter Parameter ID (PID) 0x0D into an OBD-2 device which then sends the corresponding message over the CAN bus. The ECU module that knows the vehicle speed returns the vehicle speed.
Reverse Engineering
In order to launch an attack against insurers' personalized insurance program, we reverse engineer their telematics devices 2 . We are interested in a number of questions: In what condition, and at what frequency are information collected? When does a telematics device start and end data collection? Have insurers deployed and used any anomaly detection mechanisms to prevent potentially malicious data manipulation?
To answer the aforementioned questions, we built a testbed that simulates vehicle ECU modules. The testbed allows us to monitor the request messages of a telematics device over the CAN bus so that we can better understand how the device works and observe what information it collects. In addition, the testbed allows us to control the response to the request.
In establishing our testbed, we used a commercial off-theshelf (COTS) hardware -ECUsim 2000 professional firmware edition [3] -to simulate ECU modules built in a car. The COTS hardware simulator provides physical connection to OBD-2 devices through a standard SAE J1962 female connector. Through an USB connection to the hardware simulator, we can enable software control to it, monitor OBD-2 request messages over the CAN bus and control the response to the request messages.
We connected 7 different insurance telematics devices to the ECU simulator, and then used a C program to operate the simulator. In this setup, we passively monitored the communication between the simulator and those devices, but failed to observe any messages. To understand the root cause, we inspected the electronic system of a motor vehicle and compared it with that of our ECU simulator. In particular, we used an oscilloscope to observe the voltage changes of the SAE J1962 female connector on both systems. According to CAN specification, we measured the change of the electrical signal at PIN 6, PIN 14 and PIN 16 3 . We observed the same patterns on voltage change from the motor vehicle and our simulator when the car key is not beyond the 'ignition on' position. As the motor vehicle starts, we found the vehicle system yields a voltage jump of 1 ∼ 2 volt at PIN 16, whereas we did not observe such a jump from our simulator. Our hypothesis is that our simulator does not emulate a car's ignition and insurance telematics devices start to request information from a motor vehicle only when they detect such a voltage jump. Therefore, we utilized an adjustable voltage power supply to power the simulator. In particular, we tuned up the voltage volume at PIN 16 from 12V to 13.3V. From our simulator, we observed all the tested telematics devices start to request information about vehicle operation after switching their operation voltage to 13.3V.
We set up our testbed with our ECU simulator and an adjustable voltage power supply, and used it to understand the workflows of telematics devices from 7 auto insurance providers in the US. In particular, we used our testbed to monitor the request messages from each telematics device, and vary the response accordingly. In this work, we disclose the workflows of these telematics devices in general.
We mark off the workflow of a telematics device into three phases -engine ignition, engine in operation and engine shut-off. Figure 2 illustrates the workflow of a telematics device in each phase. Engine Ignition. As is discussed above, the operation voltage of a telematics device is 13.3V. When detecting 13.3V, the telematics device starts to request information about vehicle operation including the speed and engine Revolutions Per Minute (RPM). Using RPM, the telematics device determines if the ignition is on. In particular, when RPM reading is above zero, the telematics device sets its internal state to "ignition on".
As is shown in Figure 2 , every time upon its physical contact with the car, the telematics device also requests Vehicle Identification Number (VIN). This indicates that the insurer might be aware of tampering if a policyholder attempts to earn an unlawful discount by unplugging his telematics device right before a trip and plugging it back after the trip.
In addition to RPM, speed and VIN, we also surprisingly found that some telematics devices attempt to access Diagnostic Trouble Codes (DTCs) of the motor vehicle, which indicate the malfunctions within the vehicle. While the corresponding insurers claim they calculate a discount only based on a variety of factors related to driving activities, considering the malfunction information may be used a factor to affect one's insurance rate and the insurers fail to specify the collection of such information in their privacy policy, we believe it is suspicious and inappropriate to collect malfunction information within a car without a clear declaration. Engine in Operation. Once the engine is started (i.e., the operation voltage reaches 13.3V, and RPM and MAF readings are above zero), the telematics device starts to query vehicle speed repeatedly. In particular, the device sends the vehicle speed request over the CAN bus once every second presumably because most motor vehicles refresh their OBD readings at about the same frequency. As the vehicle is moving, the telematics device also monitors abrupt decreases in vehicle speed. More specifically, the telematics device beeps if it discovers a change more than certain kilometers 4 in consecutive speed readings. Engine Shut-off. The telematics device stops querying vehicle speed when its operation voltage drops below 13.3V. However, it does not terminate completely. As shown in Figure 2 , the telematics device instead checks the speed of the engine and the mass of air flowing into the engine presumably because some cars shut off their engines at stoplights for fuel saving and emission reducing and the insurer does not want to mistakenly count such engine restart as the be- Figure 2 : The workflow of a telematics device in general.
ginning of a new trip. In fact, the telematics device marks the end of a trip only when its operation voltage is below 13.3V, and the readings of MAF and RPM are equal to zero. In addition to exploring the workflows of the insurance telematics devices, we utilized our testbed to examine if insurers have already deployed any anomaly detection systems to exclude obvious anomalies, e.g., extremely high vehicle speed. In particular, we emulated a trip where our testbed constantly responded telematics devices with a vehicle speed of 157 miles per hour for about 80 minutes. Then, we observed the trip through the aforementioned insurers' web interfaces. To our surprise, insurers involved in our experiment all log and present our emulated trip on their web interfaces (see Figure 3) . As insurers log legitimate trips and present corresponding information through their web interfaces, the presentation of our emulated trip indicates the absence of anomaly detection on insurer side.
Attack
As is discussed earlier, an insurer calculates a personalized insurance rate for each policyholder based on the data gathered from his telematics device, and the factors that affect one's insurance rate are publicly known [8, 1] . This provides an unlawful customer with a possibility of altering the data to his telematics device and obtaining a fraudulent discount. Here, we propose two attacks against personalized insurance program provided by 7 different insurers and demonstrate both attacks could potentially allow an adversary to earn an unlawful discount.
Offline Attack
Our first attack is an offline attack which roots in conventional replay attacks. In particular, an adversary first records a data trace representing safe driving activities. Then, he replays the data trace to his telematics device. Since the data trace represents safe driving activities, the adversary can mislead an insurer into believing he is eligible to an insurance discount even though he is a high-risk driver.
To demonstrate this attack, we first developed a data collection platform which allows us to obtain the driving information from a car's OBD computer. The data collection platform consists of two components: a bluetooth OBD-2 adapter physically connected to a car's OBD-2 port, and an Android phone that communicates with the car's OBD computer through the bluetooth adapter.
Using the data collection platform, we recorded a 10-mile trip for 15 minutes. Then, we replayed the trip by responding telematics devices with corresponding data we collected. In particular, we connected telematics devices to the testbed we discussed in the previous section, and then used it to respond those devices accordingly. We performed this replay attack once every day in a week-long period. Through those insurers' web interfaces, we observed all insurers logged our replayed trip for seven consecutive days. Again, this indicates these insurers have not yet deployed any anomaly detection system to identify obvious anomalies (i.e., exactly the same driving activities shown to insurers for many days).
Online Attack
Despite effectiveness, the replay attack can be easily detected. As the replay attack does not need to be carried out in a moving vehicle -and some insurance telematics devices have been designed with a GPS component -one instinctive detection scheme is to use GPS to collect vehicle location and examine if the car is in motion. In response to the limitation of replay attacks, we propose another attack.
Our second attack is an online attack which manipulates the data representing dangerous driving activities. Different from the first attack, this attack is carried out on the fly. In particular, we built a man-in-the-middle (MITM) box which bridges a car's OBD-2 port and a telematics device. Our MITM box monitors the response messages to a telematics device. Once it detects a response message indicating an abrupt decrease in vehicle speed, it will flatten speed changes because a sudden drop in speed will be transmitted back to insurers and has a negative impact upon the policyholder's discount. With the knowledge of the insurer's threshold that identifies a hard brake, our MITM box simply responds the highest value that is below the threshold. Since our MITM box is installed inside a motor vehicle carrying out data manipulation while the vehicle is in motion, this online attack is resistant to the aforementioned defense which utilizes location information to identify the malicious attack.
We implemented an MITM box prototype which consists of three components: (1) an ELM327 adaptor that connects a laptop and a car's OBD-2 port, (2) a C program that monitors response messages from a car's OBD computer, and manipulates them if necessary and (3) an ECUsim 2000 sim- Figure 4 : The man-in-the-middle box that bridges a car's OBD-2 port and a telematics device.
ulator that encodes forwarded OBD-2 readings (potentially manipulated) into CAN message. Figure 4 shows how these components are assembled. We installed our MITM box in a 2014 Subaru Forester and experimented its effectiveness in a trip. In our experiment, we intentionally pushed brake pedal hard. However, we did not observe those telematics devices capture such dangerous driving activities.
Discussion

Cost
As is described above, we demonstrated our attacks using off-the-shelf hardware (i.e., ECU Sim 2000 and ELM 327 cable). These hardware devices typically cost a couple of hundred dollars. However, the investment in these devices does not frighten miscreants off, especially considering the long-term insurance discounts to which they are not otherwise entitled. In addition, following Moore's Law, we can expect the fall in hardware price and thus the low cost of our attack.
Ethical Concerns
In this work, our goal is not to obtain unlawful profits. Rather, we expose the vulnerability resided in insurance telematics devices. As such, we purchased a car insurance coverage from 7 different insurers, enrolled our own vehicle in a discount program and experimented our attacks in a time window of three weeks. Before and after our 3-week experiment, we did not plug the telematics devices to our registered vehicle. Thus, this allows us to experiment attacks without jeopardizing insurers' business. Note that once policyholders enroll in a discount program and have their telematics devices plugged into the registered vehicle for 30 days, insurers evaluate their driving behavior and apply their initial discount.
DEFENSE OVERVIEW
The aforementioned attacks exploit the fact that the auto insurance discount program is lack of an effective mechanism to check the integrity of the data acquired from end users. Once a telematics device is handed out to the end users, an insurer loses their control to the data collection. As a result, unlawful customers can manipulate their telematics devices in various ways with the goal of obtaining fraudulent discounts. In other words, without an integrity check to the data collected from users, the auto insurance discount program is highly vulnerable to information manipulation.
In the past, many approaches have been designed to protect data integrity. Most notably, traditional computer systems utilize digital certificate to protect data integrity in transit. However, such approaches cannot be easily applied to many complex, highly-customized systems due to the difference in system design principle. Different from conventional computer systems, an auto system for example is not designed with a component to manage the risks to data availability, confidentiality and authenticity.
In fact, it is impractical to augment complicated and highly customized system with the capacity of managing threats to data. Again, take the auto system for example. From the perspective of insurance companies, it would be unrealistic if their data collection relies on a fundamental system change to their customers' motor vehicles.
In this work, we propose a new mechanism that can reduce auto insurers' exposure to data integrity threats. This new mechanism does not require any modification to auto systems. The basic idea of this mechanism is to (1) on the client side, extend telematics devices to collect unforgeable data and (2) on the server side, augment insurers' data centers with the ability to use the data to minimize the threat to aforementioned data manipulation. More specifically, we introduce a defense mechanism that contains two components -a proof-of-concept system prototype that emulates an insurance telematics device with a tamper-resistant accelerometer, and an effective detection algorithm identifying data manipulation on a remote server. The detail of our defense mechanism is discussed in Section 5 and 6, which describe the client and server side implementation respectively.
Defense Mechanism Overview
As is mentioned above, our defense mechanism contains two components. One component is for data collection and the other is for manipulation detection.
The data collection component is equipped on a motor vehicle. It gathers two types of data -vehicle speed acquired from a car's OBD computer and accelerations collected through tamper-resistant physical sensors. The data collection component periodically sends the collected data back to a central server.
The manipulation detection component runs on the central server. It processes the received data and then uses a statistical model to identify the data potentially manipulated. In particular, the manipulation detection component processes unforgeable accelerations as well as the vehicle speed which might be potentially manipulated. Using a statistical model, the detection component takes the input of accelerations and outputs a predicted velocity range. The predicted velocity range represents a normal region. In identifying potential manipulation, the detection component examines if the speed variation derived from the consecutive speed readings acquired from auto system lies in the normal region.
Trust Model
Our defense mechanism assumes that the data acquired from a car's OBD computer is untrusted. As an insurer itself is an honest party responsible for detecting potential fraud, our defense mechanism trusts the data collected through sensors built in the telematics device. In addition, our defense mechanism trusts the communication channel between the telematics device and the insurer's server. We discuss the feasibility of our assumptions below. Tamper-resistant Chip. To obtain unforgeable accelerations, an insurer can incorporate an accelerometer to its telematics device and then safeguard the device against physical attacks 5 . This can be achieved by protecting a telematics device with tamper-resistant techniques [47] . For example, an insurer can build its telematics devices using sensor mesh that constantly monitors any interruption or short-circuit on the chip [35] . Alternatively, ARM TrustZone extension can be used to attest the integrity of the sensors [39] . In fact, any device that conforms to Federal Information Processing Standard (FIPS 140-2) [FIPS] Level 4 is required to provide a hard, opaque removal-resistant coating with hardness and adhesion characteristics such that attempting to peel or pry the coating will have a high probability of resulting in serious damage to the device. Trusted Transmission. In transmitting data to the insurer's server, a secure communication channel can be easily established. It has been disclosed in [56] that, since some telematics devices transmit data through a 3G communication channel in plaintext using FTP protocol -and the devices typically do not utilize any network authentication mechanisms -an attacker could easily set up a faked cellular phone base station and launch a man-in-the-middle attack. Following careful implementation and design, these vulnerabilities can be easily prevented. In our defense mechanism, each telematics device should be embedded with a digital certificate, and perform an SSL authentication each time a communication channel is established.
Threat Model
The main goal of our defense mechanism is to detect the sophisticated attack discussed in the previous section. In fact, there are many other possible threats to insurance telematics devices. First, an unlawful customer might equip his telematics device into a low-risk driver's vehicle. Second, he/she could also connect his/her telematics device to an equipment that supplies electronic power and responds the device with data representing a car in parking status. Lastly, he/she may unplug the device before his/her trip and then plug it back after. Although these threats could potentially cause economic loss for insurers, they are out of our defense umbrella because they could be easily counteracted.
DEFENSE PROTOTYPE
Our prototype on the client side emulates an insurance telematics device with an embedded accelerometer. It is composed of an OBD-2 I2C adaptor [7] , a microcontroller board based on the ATmega2560 [2] and a GSM/GPRS board [4] .
The OBD-2 adaptor connects to the auto ODB-2 interface and gathers speed readings of a vehicle through SAE J1962 connector. Using a built-in MEMS based accelerometer, it also measures the acceleration of the vehicle. The microcontroller board retrieves acceleration and speed readings through the OBD-2 adaptor and temporarily logs them to a microSD card. Through the GSM/GPRS board, the microcontroller sends the acceleration and speed readings to a remote server, where our anomaly detection algorithm is running to examine the legitimacy of the data.
DEFENSE ALGORITHM
In this section, we present a statistical model that can be incorporated to the aforementioned defense mechanism and counteracts the attack discussed in Section 3. As is discussed in Section 4, the basic idea of our countermeasure is to use tamper-resistant acceleration measures to evaluate the legitimacy of the speed data acquired through an OBD2 port. Developing this idea, we introduce a statistical approach to model the relationship between speed variation and acceleration measure. Using this model, we then examine whether a newly observed speed measure is manipulated. Figure 6 illustrates three scatter plots, each of which indicates the variation in vehicle speed against the acceleration measure in each dimension. Since acceleration reflects the change in speed, intuition suggests that the speed variation and acceleration should follow a trend. In contrast, we observe that the acceleration measures in each dimension are spread out across the speed variation, and there is no clear trend between them. In statistics, this is called unobserved heterogeneity which is typically contributed by unobservable covariates (i.e., unmeasurable factors). For example, poor road conditions can be an unmeasurable factor, resulting in acceleration drift which contributes to the mismatch observed in Figure 6 .
As is discussed earlier, we need a model to capture the relationship between the acceleration measure and speed variation (i.e., y = f (x) where x and y represent an acceleration measure and a velocity variation respectively). Here, an instinctive approach is to use a single regression model to fit a function for both measures. However, a single regression approach typically suffers from the unobserved heterogeneity problem, and we do not want the aforementioned unobserved heterogeneity to influence the regression model accuracy. Therefore, we develop our statistical approach in the framework of mixture regression models which typically provide better control for unobserved heterogeneity.
In this section, we present how to model the speed variation and acceleration measure using mixture regression models. More specifically, we begin with the introduction to the framework of finite mixtures of Gaussian regression models. Then, we discuss how to use this framework to model the relationship between the acceleration and speed variation. Finally, we present how to perform manipulation detection using our model.
Framework of Mixtures of Gaussian Regression Models
Applications of mixture models have appeared in various fields including biomedical studies [37, 38, 21] , economics [34, 61] and marketing research [58, 48] . Within the family of mixture models, the mixture of Gaussian regression models has the tight structure of a parametric model and retains the flexibility of a nonparametric method. As such, it provides better control for unobserved heterogeneity. In this work, we develop our statistical model in the framework of the mixtures of Gaussian regression models. Here, we describe this framework as follows.
Notationally, we say y depends on the vector of covariates x in a mixture of J different ways if
where π1, π2, · · · , πJ are probabilities with a sum of 1. N (x βj, σ 2 j ) denotes the density of a Gaussian distribution with mean x βj and variance σ 2 j . βj is the regression coefficient for the j th covariate xj. All parameters {π1:J , β1:J , σ 2 1:J } construct a parameter set denoted by Θ.
The aforementioned framework combines J distinct Gaussian regression models, and each model is weighted by parameter πj. To use this framework to describe the relationship between data, parameters {π1:J , β1:J , σ 2 1:J } need to be estimated. In parameter estimation, the number of Gaussian regression models needs to be determined. However, this number is typically unknown in advance.
To address this problem, one typical approach [28, 53] is to assign many possible values to J, fit multiple mixture linear regression models and choose the model based on Bayesian information criterion (BIC), Akaike information criterion (AIC), Deviance information criterion (DIC), or Bayes factor. However, such an approach is not computationally efficient and may cause under-fitting or over-fitting problems.
In this work, we therefore use a Dirichlet Process (DP) [54, 22, 23] prior to relax the restriction of J and perform parameter estimation. The basic idea of this approach is to relax J to infinity (i.e., J → ∞). This is done by using DP to define the parameter set Θ over an infinite dimensional space, i.e., we allow an infinite number of parameters a priori, and posterior inference is done to select the number of parameters, then draw the posterior of Θ, P (Θ|D), using Gibbs sampler when conjugate priors are used. Note that D in P (Θ|D) denotes the observed data. In the following, we describe the detail of this approach.
Let a distribution G follows a DP with parameters α and G0, denoted by G ∼ DP (α, G0). This means G is a (random) distribution, and we can draw samples from G itself. Here, G0 is a base distribution -which has a parametric form -and acts as a prior distribution over components parameters {β1:∞, σ 2 1:∞ }. The concentration parameter, α, is a positive scalar that controls the variance of the DP. As α increases, G is more likely to be close to G0, i.e., G → G0. Thus, α represents the degree of confidence in the base distribution, G0.
We use a "stick-breaking" approach [51] to explicitly construct the DP. It is given as follows:
Then G ∼ DP (α, G0), where δ (β j ,σ 2 j ) is a point mass at (βj, σ 2 j ), and {u} ∞ j=1 is a set of independent beta distributed random variables such that uj ∼ B (1, α) .
With the modeling of πj, βj and σ 2 j (j = 1, 2, ...) over the infinite dimensional space, we can use Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) to draw their posterior P (Θ|D) and estimate all the parameters in parameter set Θ. As our modeling shares the principle of Bayesian inference in which the priors are chosen to be conjugate, we particularly use Gibbs sampling [32, 31] to draw samples of Θ from its posterior distribution.
Modeling
With the knowledge of Gaussian mixture model described above, we now define our problem with the following notation. Consider a data set with n observed measures yi, i = 1, ..., n, where each yi is an univariate value representing the variation in speed gathered through the OBD-2 port of an automotive system. Corresponding to each observed acceleration measure, we also have an unforgeable acceleration measure xi, where each xi is a 3-dimensional vector xi = (xi1, xi2, xi3) , representing an acceleration measure in 3-dimensional Euclidean space. As is discussed earlier, the speed measures through a car's OBD-2 port can be manipulated. Therefore, our goal is to identify yi manipulated by adversaries using xi.
Following the aforementioned Gaussian mixture model, we model yi through xi, and then have
and
with prior P (Θ) hierarchically defined as follows:
for pre-specified hyperparameters (e, f, µ β , V β , a, b). Here, G(e, f ) and IG(a, b) represent the density of a Gamma distribution and the density of an Inverse-Gamma distribution, respectively. In our problem, we note that posterior P (Θ|D) and prior P (Θ) are conjugate distributions. Thus, we can draw P (Θ|D) using a Gibbs sampler. In particular, we use a standard strategy in Bayesian computation. It augments the parameter space of the statistical model through mixture component indicators z1:n, i.e., zi = j indicates that yi was generated from mixture component j, or yi|zi = j, xi ∼ N (yi|x i βj, σ 2 j ), and with p(zi = j) = πj. Hence, we can draw posterior and mixture component indicators jointly.
Considering drawing posterior P (Θ|D) is computationally inefficient, especially when J approaches infinity, we finally truncate J by setting its value to its upper bound. The truncation exploits the fact that the number of components in a mixture regression model cannot be greater than the number of observed data (i.e., J ≤ n). The reason behind this fact is that the construction of mixture regression models follows a process in which each observed data (yi, xi) is assigned to one set of regression coefficients with the highest posterior probability. In other words, each pair of measure on acceleration and speed variation is mapped to one regression component in a Gaussian mixture regression model.
Detecting Manipulation
Now, we discuss how to use the aforementioned Gaussian mixture model to identify fraudulent vehicle speed measures.
As is discussed in Section 3.4, we propose two manipulation strategies -replaying driving activities of a safe vehicle operator and altering dangerous driving behaviors on the fly. In fact, adversaries could come up with numerous manipulation strategies not foreseen previously. It is not practical to use known manipulated data to construct mixture model -and use it to identify potential manipulation -because we cannot obtain an encompassing data set with all the data manipulated through all possible strategies.
As a result, we perform detection as follow. The mixture model takes an acceleration measure as an input and outputs a predicted velocity range. By examining if the speed variation measured through a car's OBD-2 port lies in the range, we can determine if the speed measure is manipulated or not.
In other words, given acceleration measure x * i and variation in speed y * derived from two consecutive speed measures yi and yi−1 acquired through a car's OBD-2 port, if y * falls in the predicted velocity range (ai, bi) derived from x * i , we identify speed measure yi normal and unmanipulated. Otherwise, we identify it manipulated. More specifically, we compute interval (ai, bi) using the following formula:
Where D represents the data set that is used for model fitting. Equation 9 is called the Bayesian predictive distribution. Equation 10 is a sampling based method for approximating the predictive distribution, where {π1:J,s, β1:J,s, σ
is a large set of samples obtained from the Gibbs sampler. By generating a large set of samples from Equation 10, we take a credible interval of the sample distribution as our predicted velocity range (ai, bi).
EVALUATION
In this section, we test our detection system in the real world. In particular, we evaluate the effectiveness of our detection algorithm using a data set collected from real drivers.
Experimental Design
To evaluate the effectiveness of our detection system, we design our experiment as follows. We recruited volunteer drivers and separated them into two different groups. In one group, we installed our detection system on cars and collected information about driving habits. Note that in our experiments, the data is collected from different car models. The only requirement is that we held our system in the same orientation to gather accelerations in a consistent setting 6 . In the other group, we plugged into cars our detection system along with the aforementioned MITM box. As is discussed in Section 3, the MITM box tampers abrupt decrease in vehicle speed. Thus, the information acquired from the second group contains manipulated measures on vehicle speed. We asked the second group of volunteers to intentionally apply hard-brakes now and then to trigger the manipulation of OBD-2 speed readings 7 .
Experiment Configuration
We conducted our experiment in the real world and configured our system as follows.
Hardware Configuration
To collect driving information, we first configure our system prototype. Motor vehicles from different manufacturers 6 In a real deployment, the insurance companies need to keep distinct classifiers for each car model because different car models have OBD-2 connectors in different orientations. 7 Volunteers only hit the brakes in suburban area where there are less cars on the road. update their ECU modules at different frequencies. While in gathering driving information, if our system requests ECU modules slowly, we may not be able to capture the subtle change of vehicle operation (i.e., lose sensitivity). In contrast, if our system requests driving information at a high frequency, it will increase the redundancy of driving information. In our experiment, we balance sensitivity and redundancy by empirically setting our system to request driving information once every second.
Different from ECU modules built in cars, the accelerometer of our system can be operated at a high frequency and detect the subtle change of vehicle operation. In our experiment, we set the accelerometer with a sample rate of 16.7 Hz.
Algorithm Configuration
We also configure the parameters needed for our detection algorithm. As is mentioned in Section 6, we generate posterior from prior distributions. Here, we configure the parameters used by the prior distributions. As we need the prior distributions to be less informative, we set their parameters with e = 10, f = 1, m =< 0, 0, 0 >, λ = 5. We initialize Gibbs sampler using our prior distributions and run for a total of 30,000 iterations. Then, we use the last 15, 000 draws as the posterior distributions.
Dataset
In total, our detection system collects 89 trips that constitute a set of raw data covering 1,034 miles across vehicles from 6 manufacturers. Among the 89 trips, 40 trips contain manipulated vehicle speed. The manipulation to the OBD-2 speed reading is not triggered frequently -less than 1% of all the collected data points are modified. Each record in the raw data set contains vehicle speed measured from a car's onboard diagnostic computer and accelerations measured from accelerometers. An acceleration measure is a tuple that contains three elements indicating the linear acceleration in three orthogonal planes.
As is discussed earlier, our detection algorithm takes the input of acceleration measures, outputs a predicted velocity range and examines if the variation in consecutive speed measures belongs to the interval. Therefore, we compute the speed variation by taking the difference of two consecutive measures on vehicle speed. In addition, we re-construct the acceleration measures. As is mentioned above, our system collects acceleration information at a high frequency while gathering speed information at a relatively low rate. To utilize acceleration measures to predict a speed variation, we need one-to-one mapping from acceleration to vehicle speed. In our experiment, we take the average of all its measures in a time window of one second, and then use the average measure to represent the acceleration at that time point. In this way, we obtain a data set with 90,434 records, each of which indicates a speed variation and the corresponding accelerations at that time point.
As is mentioned above, we have two groups of volunteers who participate in our experiment in different settings. Based on the source of the data acquired, we therefore split our data records into two sets. In particular, our first set contains 14,170 data records derived from the first group of volunteer drivers, while the second comes from the other group of volunteers. As the first data set does not contain tampered vehicle speed, we use it to construct our detection model. In contrast, the second set contains manipulated vehicle speed, and thus we use it to evaluate our detection model.
Results
Using the algorithm described in Section 6 and the data set discussed above, we construct a mixture Gaussian regression model. In the following, we describe the characteristics of the model followed by the evaluation of its effectiveness.
Characteristics
Our final mixture regression model contains 10 "non-empty" components, i.e., πi ≥ 10 −5 with i ∈ [1, 2, · · ·10]. Table 1 shows the value of the weight across each component (i.e., π1:10). As we observe from the table, our model consists of one dominant and nine minor components because the value of π1 is significantly greater than the values of the succeeding weights. This indicates that, the variation in vehicle speed is mainly dominated by the accelerations of a motor vehicle but at the same time largely influenced by unmeasurable noise (e.g., the noise introduced by poor road condition, engine vibrations and bad weather).
Taking a close look at each component -especially the values of parameter β1:3 -we further examine the most and least significant variables in our model. To illustrate, we take the dominant component for example and plot the draws of β1:3 in Figure 7 . In this figure, the space between the red lines represents a 95% credible interval. Using it, we can easily assess both the practical and statistical significance for a given covariate. In this particular case, we can say variable x1 and x2 are significant because the central points of β1 and β2 fall at 0.2 and 0.4, respectively. In addition, both the credible intervals do not contain 0. In contrast, x3 is a least significant variable for the reason that the central point of β3 is approximately zero. In our experiment, x1 and x2 represent the accelerations in forward and lateral directions, whereas x3 indicates the acceleration in the direction perpendicular to the ground. As such, variable x3 has nearly no contribution to speed variation, whereas variable x1 and x2 are more informative in predicting speed variation. Figure 9 plots a receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curve that illustrates the true positive rate against the false positive rate at various threshold settings. Our detection algorithm exhibits a false positive rate of 0.032 when the false negative rate is equal to 0.013. This low false negative indicates that our detection is highly precise in identifying manipulated vehicle speed, and the low false positive demonstrates that our detection algorithm is less likely to pinpoint an unmanipulated speed as a manipulated one.
Effectiveness
We also take a closer look at those small amounts of manipulated data points that our algorithm fails to detect. Figure 8a showcases a representative sample data trace indicating a hard brake before and after it gets manipulated. Our detection algorithm can identify all the manipulated data points except the one marked in the figure. Although our algorithm fails to identify the last manipulated data point, we observe that, the algorithm accurately marks the majority of manipulated data points in this dangerous hard brake. If we take this hard brake as an event, this false negative is by no means our algorithm misses out speed manipulation. As such a case is common in our data set, our algorithm can successfully identify all hard brake events despite missed individual data points.
Finally, we inspect those data points that our algorithm mistakenly identifies as manipulated. In Figure 8b , we illustrate a representative unmanipulated data trace in which we highlight two data points that we mistakenly identify as manipulated. Compared with those manipulated data points identified precisely in Figure 8a , the mistakenly identified data points are spread out across time. This means we can easily rule out the data points that our algorithm mistakenly identifies as manipulated (i.e., false positive). Similar to the showcase discussed above, such an observation is common in our data set, and thus the false positives do not incur misjudgment (i.e., identifying an innocent driver as a miscreant).
DISCUSSION
In this section, we first discuss some security and overhead issues of the proposed defense mechanism. Then, we discuss other defense options, their limitations and some related issues concerning the aforementioned attack. Issues Related to the Current Design. Our statistical model outputs a predicted velocity range. In detecting speed manipulation, we examine if the speed variation measure from the OBD-2 extends outside our predicted velocity range. A sophisticated attacker could implement an enhanced MITM box that manipulates the OBD-2 readings based on the predicted velocity range. However, such attack is infeasible considering the restricted computing capability in the telematics devices.
In our design, the telematics devices additionally send averaged accelerometer readings to the insurer's server, which may have impacts to both the computation and network communication. Since the averaging algorithm mentioned in Section 7.3 is extremely simple, the computation overhead can be neglectable. In addition, the averaged acceleration data is sent at 1HZ along with the OBD-2 readings, so the network traffic is quadrupled (acceleration data has 3 axes). Spatial Anomaly Detection. In addition to the aforementioned defense mechanism, another defense option is to detect manipulation using location information, which can be obtain from GPS chips [40] . An insurer can use GPS information to identify the motion of the car at a coarse granularity, and catch fraudulent activities if a miscreant simply replays a pre-recorded driving trace without making his vehicle in motion.
However, the location based defense provides inadequate reliability and accuracy. From a reliability standpoint, the location information may not be always available. Since the GPS receiver is dependent upon unobstructed view to satellites, the location based detection fails when a vehicle is moving along urban canyons (tall buildings and tunnels), or a GPS device is unable to stay sufficiently close to the window of a moving vehicle. From an accuracy standpoint, current GPS-based solutions provide only modest accuracy. GPS devices are positional speedometers based on how far the device has moved since the last measurement. The speed information is calculated based on formulas and is normalized, so it is not an instant value [50] . Many GPS receivers output data at 1Hz, as a result, fine-grain acceleration data in this second is lost. This coarse-grain measurement is ineffective for subtle manipulates of velocity readings. On the contrary, using accelerometer, we can capture instant acceleration at a higher frequency (in our experiment, we used 16.7 HZ). Driving Behavior Identification. Abnormal driving behavior monitoring is a technique developed to improve drivers' awareness of their driving habits (e.g., [19, 46] ). Using a variety of sensors, such as accelerometer and gyroscope, it identifies dangerous driving activities in a trip. In customizing insurance rate, insurers also identify dangerous driving activities, particularly using the velocity readings acquired from a telematics device. As such, intuition might suggest that the driving behavior monitoring technique could be a substitution to current telematics-based technique. Since existing tamper-resilient techniques can safeguard sensors and make sensor readings unforgeable [39] , this substituted solution can be another defense option. For example, AAA Drive is an APP that is installed on a customer's smartphone to monitor the driver's driving behavior [43] . Similar to telematics-based techniques, good driving behavior is the criterion for premium discount. In practice, this solution however is infeasible. First, smartphone-based monitoring cannot stop a miscreant to refuse to log high-risk journeys. Currently, insurer like AAA requires the customers to maintain a minimal mileage each month to remain eligible for the program. Second, insurers need to identify subtle variations in vehicle speed to determine if a vehicle brakes suddenly, whereas the driving behavior monitoring cannot accurately distinguish information pertaining to movement behavior from other factors that affect the sensor readings.
In particular, potholes and other severe road surface can mask the relevant information.
CONCLUSION
In this paper, we present a new attack against personalized auto insurance services. It exploits the fact that personalized auto insurance services are lack of an effective mechanism to verify the authenticity of the data that they collect for personalized pricing. Launching this attack, a miscreant can obtain unlawful financial profits. While the attack is trivial, it can bring about significant negative impacts on auto insurers, especially considering an increasing number of auto insurers use personalized pricing to open up new avenues of growth. In response to the new attack, we also introduce a defense mechanism which verifies data integrity by utilizing unforgeable data acquired from the physical world. Using trustworthy data acquired from the physical world, we construct a sophisticated statistical model to counteract the attack against personalized insurance pricing. As part of future work, we plan to collaborate with auto insurers and incorporate our defense mechanism into their personalized auto insurance services.
